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COMES NOW, Petitioner/Plaintiff ACI NORTHWEST, INC., an Idaho corporation
("ACI"), by and through its attorneys, JA.JvIBS, VER.NON & "lEEKS, PA, and hereby presents
Appelianf s Reply Brief

ARGUMENT
Introduction.
ACI's main contention is that ParkWest Homes. LLC v. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678, 302
P .3d 18 (2013) ("Park West

should be reversed or modified because trust deed trustees are

nominal parries whose interest in the secured property consists only of a power of sale
exercisable upon certain conditions, notably, default in the underlying obligation, recording of
the notice of defauh. and proper notice. See Idaho Code §§ 45-1505, 1506. ACI contends that
trust deed trustees' interest in the secured property is insufficient to make the trustees necessary
parties in a mechanics lien foreclosure action. By contrast, the trustor (grantor or true owner of
the property) and the beneficiary (the lender who requires that the trustor's repayment of the
underlying obligation be secured by the real property) are certainly necessary parties to a
mechanics lien foreclosure. But in a case such as this one, which does not involve a subsequent
purchaser of the property as was the case in Park West. the trustee was not a necessary party to
the lien foreclosure action.
Respondents failed to address this issue and failed to advance a reason why ParkWest
should not be modified or overturned except to say that it is the law and that ACI has failed to
show adequate reason for the modification or reversal. Respondents claim that the record is
inadequate, failing to acknowledge, as it did below, that their motion for summary judgment the
granting of which gave rise to this appeal, involved undisputed facts and an "issue [which] is
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strictly one oflaw.'· Tr. p. 13, LL 10-23. The district court granted partial summary judgment
by applying ParkWest to the undisputed facts.
ACI argued that ParkWest, Long v. rflilliams, 105 Idaho 585, 586, 671 P.2d 1048, (1983),
and Defendant A. v Idaho State Bar, 132 Idaho 662, 978 P.2d 222 (1999), describe a deed of
trust as a "mortgage with a power of sale," which is incorrect, has caused confusion. and is not
based on Idaho law. Idaho· s statutorily created deed of trust is not a mortgage. This error
commenced through a citation to a California case which erroneously cited to an ancient Idaho
case published sixty years before Idaho's Trust Deeds Act was passed in 1957. Respondents did
not address this.
AC1 respectfully contends that this Court· s decision in Park West has greatly expanded
the nature and quality of the trustee· s legal titie because the Court focused on certain words and
phrases, over-interpreting them. and relied on faulty analyses in older Idaho cases and a
California case. The Trust Deeds Act, when read as a whole, confirms this conclusion.
Respondents did not address this argument
ACI argued that the district court erred in vai.-ious ways, among them, not recognizing
that the facts in the present case are different from the ParkWest case. Respondents overlooked
ACI's arguments that the district court erred in sections RC D, E, and F, of its brief and argued
instead that ACI has not claimed the district court erred at all. 1n response to ACI's argument
that the district court erred in construing Idaho Code § 45-510 to invalidate an otherwise valid
lien because the trustees of subordinate deeds of trusts were not na.."Iled in the foreclosure law
suit Respondents cited to a number of older cases that did not involve a trustee of a deed of trust.
They did not however, respond to ACI's contention that Idaho Code§§ 45-507 and 510 do not
require naming the trustees of the subordinate deeds of tn1st in the claim of lien m the
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foreclosure action. ACI recognizes that the district court based its decision on ParkWest and
consequently, ACI has sought the modification or reversal of ParkWest. StilL there is a failure in
Respondents' brief to directly respond to ACI's argument. ACI argued that the district court's
judgment is unclear concerning the priority of ACI's iien vis-a-vis the trust deeds. Respondents'
rejoinder is that ACI failed to raise the issue below.
ACI addresses each of Respondents' arguments in this Reply Brief.

A. Appellant Has Established Strong Reasons for Overturning Park West Homes v.
Barnson.
The Appellant has established strong reasons for overturning ParkWest Homes, LLC v.

Barnson. Besides the ParkWest case, there are no Idaho cases that require a deed of trust trustee
to be named in a mechanics lien foreclosure action. That decision can and should be revisited
and either reversed or modified to avoid a result that is manifestly wrong, unjust and unwise. A
deed of trust trustee does not hold a significant enough property interest to be a necessaJJ party
in a mechanics lien foreclosure action when property is encumbered by a junior deed of trust.
1. The Sole Idaho Case Requiring Trustees of Subordinate Deeds of Trust to be
Named in a Mechanics Lien Foreclosure Action is Park West Homes, LLC v.
Barnson.

The onl:· Ida.._l·10 case addressing the failure to join a trustee under a deed of trust in a
mechanics lien foreclosure action is ParkWest Homes. LLC v. Barnson 154 Idaho 678, 302 P.3d
18 (2013). The other cases cited by Respondents are distinguishable. Continentai &

Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Pactfic Coast Pipe Co, 222 F. 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1915), did
not deal with a deed of trust, but with a mortgage. In that case, there was a complete failure to
name the mortgagee of real property in an action to foreclose on a senior mechanics lien. Id.
There, the court held that a foreclosure action must be "brought against all of those whose rights,
estates, or interests are claimed to be adverse and subordinate." Id. However, a trustee under a
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deed of trust and a mortgagee are not comparable. Mortgagees are more comparable to the trust
deed beneficiaries who were named in ACT's lien foreclosure action. Continental & Commercial
Trust & Savings Bank did not address the specific issue in this appeai; nor could it as Idaho's

Trust Deeds statute was not passed until 1957. Idaho Code, Title 45, Chapter 15.
Another old case cited by the Respondents, Western Loan & Building Co. v. Gem State
Lumber Co., 32 ldaho 497, 185 P. 554

919), dealt with a failure to name a mortgagee in a

mechanics lien foreclosure. Bonner Building Supply, Inc. v. Standard Forest Products. Inc., 106
Idaho 682, 682 P.2d 635 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984), involved a priority battle between a mechanics
lien holder and a purchaser of real property from a sheriffs sale. The purchaser bought the
property at a sheriffs sale and subsequently the mechanics lien holder foreclosed on the lien
vvithout naming the purchaser and current owner of the property. Id. That case is factually
distinguishable. The purchaser owned all interests to the property, subject to the lien, and the
lien holder's failure to name the current owner of the property should have, and did in fact, result
in the ineffectiveness of the lien foreclosure against the unjoined interest of the purchaser.
Here, however, the trustee does not own all interests in the encumbered property as does
a subsequent purchaser. Unlike a mortgagee, a trustee is not owed money. Instead, a trustee
holds a bare legal title to sell the property in the event of default, but nothing more. A trustee's
interest is nominal, and this difference in the interests held by subsequent purchasers,
mortgagees, and trustees is of critical importance. Respondents cite many cases for the
proposition that adverse subordinate interests must be named in a mechanics lien foreclosure
action in order for the action to ai."fect the interests of such subordinate interests. ACI does not
dispute the proposition or the cases, but they do not deal with very limited, nominal interest of a
trustee under a deed of trust.
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This case involves a mechanics lien foreclosure action that named all significant and
interested parties, but failed to name the trustees of the deeds of trust. The issue has only
recently been addressed in the Park:Wesr case. That case is distinguishable because in ParkWest
there had been a trustee's sale to a subsequent purchaser. ACI now requests that this Court
reconsider its holding in ParkWesr and its impact in the present case. ACI believes that the
holding of the ParkWest case should be overrurned because the legal interest held by a trustee to
a deed of trust is so limited that a trustee is not a necessary party.

If this Coun declines to

overturn ParkWest, ACI requests the Court to hold that this case is distinguishable from and is
not controlled by ParkWest.

2. There is No Dispute that ACI Did Not Name the Trustees in the Lien
Foreclosure Action; this Court is FuHy Authorized to Revisit ParkWest v.
Barnson.
ACI has never contended that the trustees were timely joined in the lien foreclosure
action, and Respondents' assertion that ACI cannot escape that fact is pointless. The overarching
issue on appeal is whether the trustees under the subordinate Deeds of Trust must be joined in a
lien foreclosure action when all other parties to the deed of trust including the deed of trust
grantors and beneficiaries, were timely joined in the action pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-510.

ParkWesr is factually distinguishable from this case. Moreover. is well established that
this Court is not bound by its prior decisions if it determines that a decision is "'manifestly
wrong." Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 585, 226 P.3d 524, 527 (2010). The idea
that the highest court cannot deviate from its prior decisions is neither accurate nor logical. Such

an idea would leave us in a legal state in which our public schools were still segregated. See
Brown v. Bd o_f Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954) (repudiation of Plessy v. Ferguson by the
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Supreme Court of the United States). This Court certainly has the right to revisit any of its prior
decisions at any time.
Respondents correctly argue that there is ample case law interpreting Idaho's mechanics
lien statute, but fail to acknowledge that there is only one case dealing with the failure to include
a deed of trust trustee in a mechanics lien foreclosure action. This case does not involve the
simple issue of the date to which a mechanics lien relates back, as was the issue in Grease Spot.

Inc. r. Harnes. Instead, it involves the nature of the "title" that passes to a trustee under a deed
of trust and what the intent of the Idaho legislature was stating that "title" was conveyed to a
trustee. ACI contends, consistent with the statute, that the trustee has little or no function-and
certainly no duties-until and unless there is a default. Even then, the beneficiary often names a
successor trustee. The trustee may resign at any time. The trustee may not be aware of being
named as a trustee. Statutorily, the trustee has no duty or right to manage the property and no
right to sell the property unless directed to do so by the beneficiary when there is a default and
statutory notice requirements have been met. In other words, the Idaho Legislature never
intended to create an actual trustee or a true titled owner like a purchaser or a foreclosing
mortgagee. The Idaho Legislature only allowed the trustee enough legal title to sell the
encumbered property when a default occurs, a very limited title that makes no difference in the
foreclosure of a mechanics lien with priority.
Respondent suggests that ParkWest 's lack of negative treatment in other states means
that there is no need to question its holding. This analysis is misguided. The ParkWest case has
no precedential value outside ofldaho. ACI points out that the ParkWest case has been given
neither negative nor positive treatment by other state appellate courts.
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The doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent this Court from reconsidering its holding in

ParkWest. Application of the holding in Park'FVest to the facts of this case does in fact produce a
result that is '·manifestJy v,trong ... unjust [and] unwise." Houghland Farms. inc. v. Johnson, 119
ldaho 72, 77 (1990). It is manifestly unjust that ACI should lose its mechanics lien encumbering
the Monument Heights' property simply because it failed to name trustees who only hold a
power of sale which can be exercised on the occu..TTence of certain contingencies.

It is unjust that ACI should lose its lien priority for failure to name such insignificant
parties, especially in light of the fact that Idaho's mechanics lien statute is directed to be
construed liberally in favor oflien claimants "with a vie~· to effect their object and promote
justice." Layrite Prods. Co. v. Lux, 86 ldaho 477, 483-484, 388 P.2d 105, 109 (1964): see also
Turnboo v. Keele, 86 Idaho 101. 383 P.2d 591 (1963); Dybvig v. TVillis, 59 ldaho 160, 82 P.2d 95

(1938), Phillips v. Salmon River Min & Developmenr Co., 9 ldaho 149, 72 P. 886 (1903). Tnis
Cou..rt essentially has held that the trustee holds a single stick from the "bundle of sticks" that
comprises property rights:
We hold that the deed of trust conveys to the trustee nothing more than a power of
sale, capable of exercise upon the occurrence of certain contingencies (such as
default in payment) and leaves in the trustor a legal estate comprised of all
incidents of ownership.
Long v. Williams, 105 ldaho 585,586,671 P.2d 1048, 1049 (1983) (emphasis added). This

language from Long is consistent with Idaho's Trust Deeds Act, Title 45, Chapter 15 of the Idaho
Code.

It is unjust to allow the failure to name the holder of the power of sale in the foreclosure
action to cause the failure of the superior lien when the holders of all other "incidents of
ownership" were named. This is a result that could only be reached by erroneously treating "'all
incidents of ownership as being vested with the trustee and not the grantor: nothing less would
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[lead] to a complete failure of [ACI's] lien against" the Monument Heights property. Hilary M.
Soltman, Inspecting a Faulty Foundation in ParkWest Homes v. Barnson, The Advocate,
Nov./Dec. 2013, at 29 (emphasis in the original).
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has held that the failure to provide notice to trustees of
a prior mortgage when filing a mechanics lien suit against the property was not problematic
because "it would be highly inequitable to repel [a] lien claimant because of his original failure
to name ... those having so little interest in the property" and who are "iittle more than nominal
defendants." Niehaus v. CB. Barker Const. Co., 135 Tenn. 382, 186 S.V\·. 461,464 (1916)
(emphasis added). Although the subject deeds of trust are subordinate to the subject mechanics
liens, the trustees likewise had so little interest in the property that they would have been "little
more than nominal defendants" had they been named. Tue Tennessee Court noted that the
defense made to the lien was "extremely technical" and that Tennessee's mechanics lien statute
was to be "liberally construed'. so that "technical niceties of construction [would] not be allowed
to defeat their purpose." Id. (relied on by Anco Supply Company. Inc. v. ·,Filkes, 1986 WL 10149
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)).
Tue beneficiary under a deed of trust is a much more important party than the trustee.
For instance, in a case decided by the Supreme Colli""t of California, the court held that failure to
name the beneficiaries of a deed of trust in a lien foreclosure action caused the foreclosure to be
defective as to the deed of trust, even though the foreclosure action named the trustees of the

deed of trust. Monzerey SP. P'ship v. T,V L. Bangham, Inc., 49 Cal. 3d 454, 463-64, 777 P.2d
623 (1989). Tnat court held that "'a judgment against the trustee, the beneficiary not being a
party thereto, does not bind the latter." Id. Tue same court noted the confusion caused by
calling security devices deeds of trust, which have nothing in common with actual deeds:
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Regrettably, it appears to be too late in the development of our vocabulary to
rename deeds of trust and the "trustees" who act under those instruments. We can
only emphasize that those terms are ill-suited under modern practice to describe
the true nature of trust deeds and the limited role of trustees.

Id Thus, it would be inequitable and unjust to allow ACI's lien foreclosure to faii as to the deed
of trust for the simple failure to name the trustees to the deed of trust.

3. That Idaho is a "Title Theory'' State Does Not Alter the Analysis.
Citing to the Trust Deeds Act Idaho Code§§ 45-1502(3), (4) and 45-1513, and Long v.

Williams, for the proposition that Idaho is not a "lien theory'' but a "title passes" state,
Respondents argue that ACI is asking the Coun to usurp the Legislature's duties and turn Idaho
back into a lien theory state. Respondents are wrong: ACI makes no such request, but it does
suggest that Idai.10 may not be a title theory state and that it is a mistake to advance form over
substance by relying too heavily on the notion of title theory. It was not the Legislature, but this
Court that described Idaho as a "title passes" state. Long, 105 Idaho at 586,671 P.3d at 1049.
But to stop there would result in a gross over-interpretation of both the Trust Deeds Act and
dictum in Long v. Williams.

Long v. FVilliams involved a debtor in bankruptcy who claimed that his real property did
not become an asset in his bankruptcy estate because the trustee under the deed of trust held legal
title to the property. He argued that with the adoption of the Trust Deeds Act, Idaho became a
"title passes" state, and the Court agreed, but held that "even though title passes for the purpose

of the trust, a deed of trust is for practical purposes only a mortgage with a power of sale." 105
Idaho at 587-88, 671 P.3d at 1050-51 (emphasis added):

At the time \Villiams filed his petition in bankruptcy, he had a legal interest in the
property which was good against all persons except the [trustee] which held
nothing more than the power of sale upon the happening of certain contingencies.
Williams' interest (comprised of all other attributes of ovvnership) passed to the
trustee in bankruptcy.
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Id at 588. 671 P.3d at 1051 (emphasis added). This holding was foreshadowed earlier in the
op1ruon:
We hold that the deed of trust conveys to the trustee nothing more than a power of
sale, capable of exercise upon the occurrence of certain contingencies (such as
default in payment) and leaves in the rrustor a legal estate comprised of all
incidents of ownership.

Id at 586, 671 P.3d at l 049. Accordingiy, the "title" that passes to the trustee under a deed of
trust is very simpiy the power of sale.
The Court's analysis in Long squares with Idaho statute. Idaho Code§ 45-1502(5)
defines '·real property'· as '·any right, title, interest and claim in and to real property owned by the
grantor. ,. Thus, single sticks (in the bundle of sticks that comprises a fee simple) constitute "real
property." 'w'hen the Act defines a trust deed as "a deed executed in conformity with this act and
conveying real property to a trustee in trust to secure the performance of an obligation of the
grantor ... to a beneficiary,'· the real property interest conveyed is the power of sale. LC. § 451502(3): Long, ]05 Idaho at 586,671 P.3d at 1049.
Unlike ParkWesL this case does not involve a subsequent purchaser, a stranger to the
deed of trust, who purchased the property at a trustee's sale. Tnis distinction is important. At
the time the mechanics lien foreclosure action was COilh'llenced, the trustees held only a power of
sale; that was what their legal title comprised. The trustors (grantors) were still in possession of
the property a...nd held "all other attributes of ovmership," Long 105 Idaho at 586, 671 P .3d at
1049, and were named in the lien foreclosure action. The beneficiaries or grantees under the
deeds of trusL the persons for whose benefit the deeds of trust were made, were named in the lien
foreclosure action.
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The "lien theory" and "title passes" distinctions are largely academic in the modern world
of mortgages and deeds of trust in which the parties· rights upon default are statutory and
contractually spelled out in the mortgage or deed of trust. Title passing was important in the
Middle Ages when the Christian church considered charging interest for money-lending to be
usury, a sin. 12 Thompson on Real Property§ 101.0l(a) (David A. Thomas ed., 1994). With a
mortgage passing title to the mortgagee, the Christian money-lender could use the mortgage to
make a profit on money-lending without calling it interest, but the lender had to take possession
of the land. Id. Three theories in the United States have been used to explain the mortgage (and
not necessarily a deed of trust): 1 the title theory, the lien theory and the intermediate theory. Id.
at§ 101.0l(b). However,
[i]n most instances, the outcome of a particular controversy will not depend on the
theory applied . . . . It should be noted that it is sometimes difficult to determine
to which of these theories a particular jurisdiction adheres, for a state may take a
lien theory approach to certain controversies and a title theory approach to others.
This is particularly common in states which view themselves as title states but
which do not recognize mortgagees as being entitled to possession or rents before
default, a recognition that should put them in the group of states adopting the
intermediate theory.

Id.
In title theory states, unless the terms of the contract permit mortgagors to retain
possession of the property, mortgagees are entitled to possession when the mortgage is given.
Generally, however. the parties to a mortgage in title theory states agree that the mortgagor may
remain in possession until default. Id. at§ ] 01.01 (b)(l) (citations omitted).
By contrast,
[i)n most .American states, the legal concept of a mortgage as a transfer of a legal
title has been totally eclipsed by the view of the equity courts that title remains in
1 In rare circumstances deeds of trust "produce results different than those that would obtain under a mortgage," but
"in most states the rights of the trustor and beneficiary are equated with those of the mortgagor and mortgagee." Id.
at§ 101.0l(b)(4).
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the mortgagor and that the mortgagee holds only a lien as security.

Id. § 101.01 (b )(2). Lien theory states disagree about the enforceability of mortgage provisions
allowing the mortgagee to take possession after default but before foreclosure. In some states a
position between title theory and lien theory is taken,
holding that prior to default mortgagees hold mere liens, or, "at best a
superficial title," but that after default they acquire a legal interest. The primary
distinction between title states and intermediate theory states is that in the
absence of a contrary agreement, the mortgagee in the intermediate theory states
is not entitled to possession until default, while in the title theory states the
mortgagee is entitled to possession upon the giving of the mortgage. It is
therefore difficult to believe that so-called title theory states which do not give
possession to mortgagors until defaults are not, in reality, intermediate theory
states.

Id. § 101.01(0)(3) (citations omitted).
\\1hether Idaho follow a "lien theory, "title passes,'" or some other theory with regard to
deeds of trust is of little consequence because it is undeniable that the purpose of a deed of trust
encumbering property is to act as a lien or security. No good faith claim can be made that the
trustee of a deed of trust holds an estate with any substantial interest in the property. This Court
in Long r. Williams properly recognized that a trustee of a deed of trust holds "nothing more than
the power of sale upon the happening of certain contingencies'· and all other incidents of
ownership remain with the trustor (grantor). ] 05 Idaho at 588, 671 P .3d at 1051.
ACI simply requests that this Court recognize the limited role a deed of trust trustee
ought to play in a mechanics lien foreclosure action on property with a junior encumbrance by
deed of trust.
B. The District Court Erred in Determining That Trustees Are Necessary· Parties.

The district court erred in granting sum..'llary judgment to Respondents, but it was an
error occasioned by following ParkWest, which should be overturned or modified. Mechanics
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liens and Deeds of Trust are creatures of statute, yet the mechanics lien statute, Idaho Code § 45501 er seq., does not state who must be joined in a foreclosure action. The Idaho Code section

regarding the duration of a mechanics lien and the commencement of a foreclosure action does
not list any person or entity who must be joined. That section states:
Duration of lien. No lien provided for in this chapter binds any building, mining
claim, improvement or structure for a longer period than six (6) montl1s after the
claim has been filed, unless proceedings be commenced in a proper court within
that time to enforce such lien; or unless a payment on account is made, or
extension of credit given with expiration date thereof, and such payment or credit
and exoiration date. is endorsed on the record of the lien. then six (6) months after
the date of such payment or expiration of extension. The lien of a final judgment
obtained on any lien provided for in this chapter shall cease five (5) years from
the date the judgment becomes final ....
J.,,

,

C

,,

C

LC.§ 45-510.

Other sections of the mechanics lien statute discuss certain persons or entities, but none
mention trustees under deeds of trust. For example, § 45-507, concerning the claim oflien,
requires that the claim oflien name the '·ov.'ller, or reputed OV>'ller, if known" and describe the
property sufficiently for identification. No other persons or entities claiming an interest in the
property need be named:
Claim of lien. (1) Any person claiming a lien pursuant to the provisions of this
chapter must file a claim for record with the county recorder for the county in
which such property or some part thereof is situated.
(2) The claim shall be filed within ninety (90) days after the completion of the
labor or services. or furnishing of materiais.
(3) The claim shall contain:
(a) A statement of his demand, after deducting all just credits and offsets;
(D) The name of the oV>'ller, or reputed OV>'ller, if known;
(c) The name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he furnished
the materials; and
(d) A description of the property to be charged v.rith the lien, sufficient for
identification.
(4) Such claim must be verified by the oath of the claimant his agent or attorney,
to the effect that the affiant believes the same to be just.
(5) A true and correct copy of the claim of lien shall be served on the oV>'ller or
reputed OV>'ller of the property either by delivering a copy thereof to the owner or
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reputed owner personally or by mailing a copy thereof by certified mail to the
owner or reputed O'Wller at his last known address. Such delivery or mailing shali
be made no later than five (5) business days following the filing of said claim of
lien.
l.C. § 45-507,

Section 45-512 requires the judgment in the iien foreclosure action to declare the priority
of competing liens as follows:
Judgment to declare priority. ln every case in which different liens are asserted
against any property, the court in the judgment must declare the rank of each lien
or class of liens which shall be in the following order:
1. All laborers. other than contractors or subcontractors.
2. All materialmen including persons furnishing, renting or leasing equipment
materials or fixtures as defined in section 28-12-309. Idaho Code, other than
contractors or subcontractors.
~ Subcontractors.
4. The originai contractor.
). All professional engineers and licensed surveyors.
LC.§ 45-512. Note that none of the listed lien holders include persons holding a lien on or

interest in the property by reason of a mortgage or deed of trust.
Finally, § 45-506 provides that mechanics liens have priority over any "lien, mortgage or
other encumbrance" which attached after the time the subject work and materials were
commenced and supplied:
Liens preferred claims. The liens provided for in this chapter shall be on equal
footing with those liens within the same class of liens, Vvithout reference to the
date of the filing of the lien claim or claims and are preferred to any lien,
mortgage or other encumbrance, which may have attached subsequent to the time
when the building, improvement or structure was commenced, work done,
equipment, materials or fortures were rented or leased, or materials or
professional services were commenced to be furnished; also to any lien,
mortgage, or other encumbrance of which the lienholder had no notice, and which
was unrecorded at the time the building, improvement or structure was
commenced, work done, equipment, materials or fixtures were rented or leased, or
materials or professional services were commenced to be furnished.
LC. § 45-506.
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In short nothing in Title 45, Chapter 5 of the Idaho Code states or implies that trustees
under subsequent deeds of trust must be named in the action to foreclose a mechanics lien.
This Court relied on Palmer r. Bradford, 86 Idaho 395,401,388 P.2d 96, 99 (1963), and

Willes v. Palmer. 78 Idaho 104, ] 08. 298 P .2d 972

956), for the propositions, respectively, that

a lien foreclosure action must be brought vvithin six months or the lien will be lost and it must be
brought against the proper parties or it will be lost as to those parties not named. ParkWest, 154
Idaho at 684-85, 302 P.3d at 24-25. However, the person not named in the lien foreclosure
action in Willes was the co-owner of the property, Mrs. Palmer. Willes. 78 Idaho at 107,298
P.2d at 972. She held a full ownership interest in the property and was one of the debtors of the
lien creditor. Id. A trust deed trustee's interest is nominal compared to that of a fee owner or
even that of the trust beneficiary.
ACI respectfully submits that the problem with Park:Wesr (and the reason the district
court erred in following it) is that the actual nature of the trustee's interest in the property was
not analyzed. Instead, such concepts or phrases as "legal title" and "title theory'· were overinterpreted and elevated over the actual nature and character of the deed of trust trustee's role
and interest.

C. The Park West Case is Factually Distinguishable From The Case on Appeal and
Should Not Apply in this Case.
Respondents fail to acknowledge the important factual distinction between this case and

ParkWest. The issue presented in ParkWest was as follows:
[\\lhether a iienor seeking to enforce a mechanics lien against property
encumbered by a deed of trust must name the trustee of the deed of trust ·within
the period of time required by statute to give effect to the mechanics lien against
subsequent holders of legal title.

ParkWest, 154 Idaho at 682, 302 P.3d at 22 (emphasis added). This Court ultimately held:
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[B)ecause a mechanics lien is lost as to any interest in property not named in a
foreclosure action, we hold that a subsequeni holder of legal title to property
encumbered by a deed of trust and a mechanics lien, takes the property free and
clear of the mechanics lien, where the lienor fails to name the trustee of the deed
of trust in an action to enforce the mechanics lien within the period of time
required by statute.

Id at 685,302 P.3d at 25 (emphasis added). In both the issue and holding of ParkWestthe fact
that there was a subsequenr holder o_flegal title is emphasized. The ParkWest case dealt with a
subsequent purchaser of the property who believed that her purchase entitled her to ownership
free and clear of the mechanics lien. In this case, there is no "subsequent holder of legal title."
Because there is no subsequent purchaser, there is no need to conclude that the superior lien is
lost and unenforceable against granters and trust deed beneficiaries and other properly noticed
junior interests.

D. Liberal Construction of Mechanics Lien Statutes Compels a Determination that
ACI has a Valid Lien.
ACI is not trying to create a lien where none exists. ACI provided a substantial amount
of materials and provided a substantial amount of services and was not paid in full. ACI filed its
Claim of Lien, supplemented it, and timely filed a lien foreclosure action.
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "lien statutes must be liberally
construed in favor of the claimant" and "that a substantial compliance in good faith meets such
requirement.'' Layrite Prods. Co. r. Lux, 86 ldaho 477, 483-484, 388 P.2d 105, 109 (1964): see

also Turnboo v. Keele, 86 Idaho lOL 383 P.2d 591 (1963): Dybvig v. 'f.Villis, 59 Idaho 160, 82
P.2d 95 (1938), Phillips v. Salmon River Min & Development Co., 9 Idaho 149, 72 P. 886
(1903).
The filing requirements for a mechanics lien requiring "[t]he name of the owner, or
reputed owner, if known" should be an indication that a hyper-technical standard is not required
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in filing or foreclosing a mechanics lien. LC. § 45-507(3)(a) (emphasis added). For instance, in a
case where a mechanics lien was mistakenly filed against a lessee instead of the record owner of
the property, the Court did not hold that mistake fatal. Gem State Lbr. Co. v. Union G. & E. Co ..
47 Idaho 747, 749-750, 278 P. 775. 776 (1929).
The case law on which the Respondents rely has no relevance to the present case. ACI
timely filed a lien and was not paid for services and materials rendered to the project. ACI does
not ask the Court to create a lien where none exists, as the Respondents allege. The
Respondents' position is the opposite: Respondents ignore admonitions of Idaho case law that
"lien statutes must be liberally construed in favor of the claimanf' and "that a substantial
compliance in good faith meets such requirement."

E. Ambiguity in the District Court's Partial Summary Judgment is not an "Issue"
Required to be Raised Below
The substance and form of the district court's partial summary judgment is not an ·'issue'·
required to be raised below before proper appeal. A.n "issue" is defined as "a point in dispute
between two or more parties.,. Black's La:w Dictionary 90 '7 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th ed.. West
2009). Additionally, it is "a matter affirmed on one side and denied on the other." 35A CJ .S.

Federal Civil Procedure§ 357, at 541 (1960). Examples of"issues'· are contested liability of a
party for the injury of another, formation of a legally binding contract violation of a party's due
process protections by improper license revocation, etc. The district court's partial summary
judgment is just that a judgment.
The purpose of the rule prohibiting issues raised for the first time on appeal is to prevent
litigants from bypassing the lower courts to have this Court decide all the questions of law and
fact in the first instance. The reason for this rule was provided by the Court in Smith v. Sterling
almost 150 years ago:
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It is for the protection of inferior courts. It is manifestly unfair for a parry to go
into court and slumber, as it were. on his defense, take no exception to the ruling,
present no point for the attention of the court, and seek to present his defense, that
was never mooted before, to the judgment of the appellate court. Such a practice
would destroy the purpose of an appeal and make the supreme court one for
deciding questions of law in the first instance."
1 Idaho 128, 131 (1867).
ACI has been an active participant in the lower proceedings. The district court has
decided questions of law below. The district court's partial summary judgment the substance of
this appeal, was based on the parties· "affirm[ation] on the one side and deni[al] on the other."
Not only does ACI believe that the substance of the decision was erroneous, but also contends
that the wording of the judgment is ambiguous and unclear. The wording of the judgment is not
an "issue" that must be raised below. The judgment determined the "issues'' between the parties.
The Respondents asked for summary judgment holding that A Cr s lien is inferior to the
deeds of trust. Tne district court relied on law that would render ACT' s lien lost and
unenforceable only as to the limited interests held by the trustees to the deed of trust. The
district court granted the Respondents' partial summary judgment and held that ACI's lien is
"lost and unenforceable against the legal title held by the trustee[ s]. ,. R. at 192. The district
court's language mirrored this Court's language in ParkWest. In that case, the same conclusion
of law rendered the senior lien inferior to the junior deed of trust. That result seems manifestly
wrong, unjust and unwise when applied to the facts of this case. Thus, it is ambiguous whether
t.lie district court's partial summary judgment is intended to result in the complete failure of
A Cr s lien against the beneficiaries and grantors of the junior deeds of trust, or whether a much
more limited and common sense consequence should result: ACI's lien is only ineffective as to
the rights of the trustees, which consist only of the power of sale under certain circumstances.
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This is not an "issue'· raised for the first time on appeal. This is a challenge to the fonn of
the judgment on the basis that it is ambiguous.

F. The Overturning or Modification of Park West is Not a Legislative Matter.
Respondents' conclusory claim that "Appellant's arguments should be left for our
Legislature to address" is nonsense. ACI claims that the Court should revisit its interpretation of
prior case law and the statute itself, Idaho Code§ 45-510. ACI does not claim that the statute is
faulty.
The mechanics lien statute does not address who should be named in the lien foreclosure
action or the effect of excluding the holder of the power of sale in the event of default of any
underlying obligation secured by the deed of trust. Tne interpretation of a statute is a question of
law subject to free review. Harrison v. Binnion. 147 Idaho 645,649,214 P.3d 631,635 (2009).
"It must begin vvith the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usuaL
and ordinary meaning: and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not
ambiguous, this Court does not cor1strue it, but simply follows the law as written." Id. (quoting
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores. Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006)). In
construing an ambiguous statute, the court may examine the language used, the reasonableness
of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statute. State v. Kimball, 145 Idaho
542,544,181 P.3d 468,470 (2008). Grease Spot. Inc., 148 Idaho at 584,226 P.3d at 526.
ACI urges this Court to look closely at the "plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the
statute as a whole." Tne Idaho legislature has never said that a deed of trust is the same as a
mortgage, or that Idaho should adhere to the archaic title theory, or that Idaho Code§ 45-510
states that a trustee in a deed of trust is a necessary party to a foreclosure. iJ.l of those
conclusions are judicial interpretations of the law. ACI asserts that the proper and only entity to
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address these issues is the Idaho Supreme Court. It is this Court that should recognize that
mongages and deeds of trust may both be security instruments used in Idaho, but they are not the
same and have been created separately and share none of the same history. \Vhile mortgages
may be a medieval creation to avoid the sin of usury, with substantial mortgagor protection, a
deed of trust is a modern security instrument that has no redemption and limited grantor
protection. \\'hile title theory may have been important at one time to protect a mortgagee, it is
not applicable to a deed of trust, and a mere conveyance of the power of sale, in the event of
default, is not a conveyance of any substantial property interest. 2 \Vhile an owner and a creditor
(grantor ,u1d beneficiary) may be necessary parties to the foreclosure of a lien, the mere
auctioneer that serves at behest of the beneficiary and can be removed at any time by the
beneficiary is not a necessary party. Further, the lien statute does not say that a trustee in a deed
of trust is a necessary party for a foreclosure of a lien: in fact. it does not seem to have even
considered trustees on a deed of trust since they did not exist when the statute was passed.
The Court must not ignore the great significance of a decision that allows the owner of
the property to be unjustly enriched by the increase of value at the expense of the provider of
services and material.
ACI contends that the Idaho Legislature never intended that a provider of materials and
labor would lose its lien because a deed of trust trustee was not named in a lien foreclosure
See section A.3 of this brief. This is true notwithstanding the language in Idaho Code § 45-1502(3) and (5),
describing a trust deed as a conveyance of real property and defining real property as any interest therein, See also §
45-1503(1) in which the nature of the conveyance to the trustee by trust deed is described:
2

45-1503, Transfers in trust to secure obligation -- Foreclosure. (1) Transfers in trust of any estate
in real property as defined in section 45-1502(5), Idaho Code, may hereafter be made to secure the
performance ofan obligation of the grantor or any other person named in the deed to a beneficiary.
Where any transfer in trust of any estate in real property is hereafter made to secure the
performance of such an obligation, a power of sale is hereby conferred upon the trustee to be
exercised after a breach of the obligation for which such transfer is security, and a deed of trust
executed in conformity with this act may be foreclosed by advertisement and sale in the manner
hereinafter provided, or, at the option of beneficiary, by foreclosure as provided by law for the
foreclosure of mortgages on real property.
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action - a technicality at best. This Court is the proper entity for correcting the series of rulings
that have lead to this unfair conclusion.

G. ACI Claims Attorney's Fees on Appeal.
This case arises from a failure of a developer to pay for materials and services to a project

in which the developer was selling improved and subdivided lots. As such, it is a commercial
transaction and Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) allows the court to grant attorney fees. This case is also
ACI's attempt to recover sums owed for services and materials in which a mechanics lien was
recorded; and as such ACI's attorney's fees and costs are recoverable under Idaho Code§ 45513.

H. Respondents Are Not Entitled To Attorney Fees.
Respondents claim that A Cr s brief lacks reasoned analysis, fails to supply an adequate
record, that the appeal was brought for improper purpose, and that attorney fees should be
awarded against ACL ACI is perplexed by Respondents' arguments. The legal analysis is of
great importance to the real estate industry, title insurers, lenders, and members of the bar who
practice real estate law. The legal analysis has shown that the district court has followed
ParkWesr but that ParkfFest should be overturned or modified and t.1us case remanded to the
district court. Very little of the record is necessary ,vith respect to whether ParkWest should be
overturned or modified. Respondents· counsel recognized this below:

MR. RA..LLN: Thank you, your Honor. First I don't believe that there
has been any disputes of fact in this case as far as this motion is concerned. And
so on that level I think summary judgment remains appropriate. This Court is
familiar with - and this issue is strictly one of law ....And that is the effect of a
failure to timely join a party under 45-510. The basis for this motion against ACI,
while the law is not new, the case interpreting or giving rise to this motion is new.
And that's the Parkwest decision.
Tr. p. 13, LL. 10-23 .
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ACI requests the Court to overturn or modify ParkWesr because a trustee is not a
necessary or proper parry to a mechanics lien foreclosure action, and it would be inequitable for
ACI to lose its lien based on the failure to name a party with such a nominal interest. This is
particularly true in this case in which a subsequent purchaser is not involved and the essential
parties to the trust deeds-the trustors (grantors) and the beneficiaries (lenders) were named in
the mechanics lien foreclosure action.
Respondents seem to advance the position that an appeal can be successful only upon the
"error" of the district court. \Vhile A CI does claim that the district court erred (see Appellant's
Brief Argument sections B, C, D, E and F), ACI also acknowledges that the Cotut followed

ParkWest as it was required to do.
Respondents have cited three cases in support of its claim that attorney fees should be
awarded against ACI. In all three of the cases, the conduct discussed by the appellate court was
egregious. The first cited case the Court stated:
[A)s discussed above, the County utterly lacked any factual basis for bringing this
appeal. It had no prescription claim because it never maintained the road. For its
dedication claim, it relied on a plat map that unequivocally did not portray Burch
Lane as a public road. Next, the County admitted that it had never even checked
to see if road maintenance was necessary, undermining any reasonable legal
argument in favor of its prescription theory or of extending existing law to apply
to this case. Last, although Respondents initiated this lawsuit they did so in
response to the County's threats to forcibly remove their signs and to pursue
criminal sanctions against them. In such a stark absence of any reasonable factual
or legal justification for its actions, this Court must conclude that the Coun~ has
acted with an improper purpose under LA.R. 11.2 by harassing Respondents and
needlessly prolonging this litigation

Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497,504,236 P.3d 1257, 1264 (2010).
In the second case relied on by Respondent, Read v. Harvey, the proffered argument was
a clear misrepresentation and distortion of the actual facts:
V,Thile the record itself in this appeal is more than adequate, Harvey's
representation of it is not. Harvey's most persistent, if not persuasive, argument is
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that channel A is actually the ditch parallel to and west of the creek, which is
actually located in channel B. This argument is based on distortion and
misrepresentation of the record.
147 Idaho 364,371,209 P.3d 661, 668 (2009).

Fritts

1·.

Liddle & Moeller Const .. Inc., 144 ldaho 17L 158 P.3d 947 (2007) was also

cited by Respondents. The Court stated:
In this case, the Court was unable to review the Frittses' fact-dependent claims
because they failed to provide this Court with an adequate record. Tnough the
absence of a record undermined the entirety of this appeal, nowhere was the
problem more glaring than in the Frittses' failure to provide a transcript in
conjunction with their request for a new trial. Without a record, we must conclude
the evidence supported the district court's decisions. Accordingly, we conclude
the Frittses' appeal is not well grounded in fact under the first element of 1.A.R.
11.1. Because the Frittses bore the burden of demonstrating error by the trial
court their request for this Court to act in the absence of evidence to support their
claims was unwarranted under the second element of l.A.R. 11.1.

Id at 176, 158 P.3d at 952.
ACT' s conduct in this appeal is not comparable to the conduct of the parties in the three
cases cited. ACI properly designated a limited record because this appeal is not heavily fact
oriented and the primary issue is "strictly one oflaw." Tr. p. 13, LL. 10-23 (quoting
Respondent's counsel at the summary judgment hearing). In addition, this case involves a "good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." l.A.R. 11.2(a). That
ACI's argument for overturning, reversing or modifying ParkWest is a good faith argument is
further evidenced by Ms. Soltman · s article in Tne Advocate. 3 and the Idaho Land Title
Association's anticipated position which will be advanced in its amicus brief a
Respondent's argument that attorneys fees should be awarded against ACI is completely
unfounded.

3 Hilary M. Soltman, Inspecting a Faulty Foundation in ParkWest Homes v. Barnson, The Advocate, Nov./Dec.
2013.
4 See Motion for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae, filed May 1, 2014 by Idaho Land Title Association (permission
sought to file a brief"whicb briefing will support the position of the Appellant, ACI Northwest, lnc.") .
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, ACI respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district
court's grant of summary judgment belovv, and award ACI its attorney's fees and costs on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) and 45-513.
-14-
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